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ABSTRACT
In  the  last  decades  of  the  XX  Century  the  expansion  in  telecommunications  urged  the 
development  of  an  innovative  satellite  network  infrastructure.  Satellite  telecommunication-a 
network technology-presents public-good characteristic and high-cost and technological-risks. 
The case of the design of the Italian satellite telecommunication system consists in a peculiar 
case of public-private partnership (PPP). 
This paper compares the Sirio and Italsat satellites systems to highlight the differences in the 
partnership  agreements  between  the  public  buyer  and  the  firms  involved.  In  both  cases  the 
government  provided  clear  signals of  market  demand  to  spur  innovative  activity,  however, 
contractual obligation proved decisive. In the latter case, the public financial support took the 
form of a purchase agreement of a service with specific requirements at a specific time in the 
future, creating incentives for innovation and on-time and on-budget implementation. A public 
agency then was created to coordinate the research efforts of different firms reducing cost and 
opportunistic threats. 
Keywords:  Procurement,  Public-private  partnership,  research  and   development  agreement, 
space industry.
JEL Classification: N44, N74, 031, 038 
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Introduction1
Among the technical infrastructures that support a society, telecommunications are increasingly 
important.  In  the  last  two  decades  of  the  past  Century  the  introduction  of  digital  services 
techniques  and  the  progressive  reduction  of  transmission  costs  led  to  an  increase  in 
telecommunication  demand,  and  consequently  pushed  for  an  expansion  of  the 
telecommunication infrastructures. Also, telecommunications became vital for business in the 
context of globalization in the post cold-war era and a main source of economic activity. 
This paper explores the evolution of the form of partnership between  public and privates 
that  aims  to  deliver  innovative  types  of  telecommunication  infrastructure.  Satellite 
telecommunication  was  an  emerging,  high-cost,  and  high-risk  technology  that  introduced  a 
relevant technological change in the way people communicate. Such an infrastructure is clearly a 
public-good, often only a State can afford it. However, it is not just a matter of financial supply 
that guarantees the development of a complex technology. To obtain the best result, the public 
side of the partnership should explore the market for the proper capabilities available, design a 
feasible  project,  manage  incentives  for  its  realization  and  share  the  risk  of  the  innovative 
process. In a process of “trial and error” arrangements, the Italian government was able to launch 
two satellite  system successfully  between 1969 and  1996,  creating  an  effective  institutional 
framework for the investment in research and development of firms with the support of public 
finance and governmental coordination.
Methods and motivation
The research here presented aims to investigate the peculiar effect of public-private agreement to 
develop  a  new  technology  on  the  base  of  the  manifested  public  demand.  Furthermore,  it 
proposes an evaluation of process of technological procurement that may result beneficial to 
policy-makers. 
A public-private partnership can be established to introduce a relevant novelty in  the 
pursuing of a solution to a new or unsolved need. The State can cover all the cost connected to 
the  research  process  in  the  case  of  a  risky  technology.  Despite  the  financial  coverage,  the 
formulation of the agreement with a private company is far from delivering the outcome in the 
proper way. It may leave room for an innovative mode of linking the availability of financial 
resources  with  the  development  of  a  new  technology.  In  stand  of  financing  research  and 
1 This paper is based on a previous presentation held at the XI Milan European Economy Workshop "The 
History of European Infrastructure Finance", 22 June 2012, University of Milan.
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development indiscriminately or subsidized the installation of an infrastructure in exchange of 
exclusive rights, a government may use public procurement to trigger the development of a new 
technology.  While  the  mechanism  of  standard  public  procurement  is  not  connected  with 
technological  innovation,  technological  public  procurement  sets  specific  requirements  to  be 
developed  by the  private  contractor.  Then,  public  financial  resources  are  used  to  fulfill  the 
purchase agreement once the product is finished by date and respect the requirements. However, 
the risk avoided by such a mechanism of procurement is the achievement of a minimum market 
demand for the newly developed product, while the entire risk of product development and its 
technological feasibility is still handled completely by the private contractor. Then, the public 
buyer has a potential great role in providing technological trajectories to the private contractors 
in order to reduce uncertainty about the feasibility of the demanded  solution.
Exploring the pattern of negotiation and specification of the technological requirements 
would allow to better understand which conditions permit the most convenient mechanism of 
public funding of private technological development of an innovative infrastructure. For those 
reasons the methods selected is the analysis of the procurement of a infrastructure with high cost  
of  research  and  development  as  a  telecommunication  satellite  system  is.  Two  sequential 
procurement agreement are explored longitudinally to compare benefits and pitfalls of the two 
experiences, putting in light the “trial and error” effort made to improve the partnership.
The most suitable method that might help to observe and describe a phenomenon is an in-
depth cases study (Stuart  et al. 2002, Browning and Heath 2009), as well as to increase the 
understanding of it (McCutcheon and Meredith 1993; Handfield and Melnyk 1998; Meredith 
1998).  A case-study research  methodology  is  then  particularly  fitted  to  provide  insights  for 
further empirical research (Yin 2003). Even a single case-study can inspire new ideas and show 
how the conceptual argument might actually be applied to reality (Flynn et al. 1990; March et al. 
1991; Siggelkow 2007).
The  case  selected  regards  the  design  of  a  satellite  telecommunication  system  in  Italy 
between 1971 and 1996. The satellite infrastructure was public and  committed by the national 
government  to  private companies to fit  technical  requirements which forced them to pursuit 
incremental innovations in the satellite system design. The public purchase was motivated by a 
perceived future need - the increase of traffic demand - and therefore it can be considered the 
public procurement of a not yet existing technology. Two different satellite system are observed: 
Sirio, started in 1969 and launched in 1977; and Italsat, developed between 1981 and 1991, with 
a further satellite  within the same program launched in 1996. The comparison of two cases 
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allows to test  the independent variable correspondent to the different financial  and technical 
agreement that formed the public-private partnership. 
Theoretical framework
When a government acts as a buyer of a product to be developed in order to forestall a future 
need and for doing so sets requirements to be fulfilled, that government is using a demand-tool  
of innovation policy. 
Demand-driven innovation policies are measures that induce or speed up the production of 
knowledge and innovations  through public  demand or  by  supporting private  demand.  Edler 
(2009) has defined demand based innovation policies “a set of public measures to increase the 
demand  for  innovations,  to  improve  the  conditions  for  the  uptake  of  innovations  and/or  to 
improve  the  articulation  of  demand  in  order  to  spur  innovations  and  the  diffusion  of 
innovations”. 
Research on the impact of demand on new product development strategies has investigated 
the influence of consumer needs on technology development at the level of technology projects 
(von Hippel 1988; Lynn, Morone, and Paulson 1996), business strategy (Kim and Mauborgne 
1997; Day 1990, MacMillan and McGrath 2000) emerging competition (Adner 2002) and the 
broader  evolution  of  technological  trajectories  (Abernathy  and  Clark  1985;  Malerba  1985; 
Christensen 1997; Sutton 1998; Malerba et al. 1999; Adner and Levinthal 2001; Tripsas 2001).
 In  the  case  of  a  infrastructure  network,  public  demand  is  often  essential  to  reach  a 
minimum scale effect needed  to overcome the high entry cost of a new developed product, 
service,  or  process,  creating  the  market  conditions  for  its  diffusion.  Then,  when demand is 
sufficiently strong and clear, the market can provide influences on innovative activities (Porter 
1990). 
However,  not every demand policy focuses on innovation.  For instance,  standard public 
procurement is the purchase of an existing product or service by a public authority that does not  
explicitly imply any innovation.  Conversely, public procurement to effectively foster innovation 
demands  for  something,  either  product  or  service,  that  need  to  be  developed.  Edquist  and 
Hommen (2000)  defined  public  technology procurement the  purchase  "of  a  not-yet-existing 
product or system whose design and production will require further, if not completely novel, 
technological development work". The functional requirements of the  product are predefined by 
the  government,  but  the  realization  and  development  are  not  (Rothwell  and Zegveld  1981; 
Geroski  1990;  Aschhoff  &  Sofka  2009).  The  positive  impact  of  public  procurement  on 
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innovation  activities  is  related  to  the  nature  of  many  research-intensive  industries  such  as 
aviation and military related, where public administrations are the main source of demand and 
act as lead users for innovations. 
Governments  use  innovation  policies  to  strengthen  the  link  between  knowledge 
production and the final high-tech product (Borrás 2001). In the case of complex technologies, 
governments  may  set  up  dedicated  institutions  in  order  to  better  design  requirements  and 
feasibility in the form of technical agency. As prescribed by institutional theory, institutions exist 
to  reduce constraints in the transfer of knowledge; according to this view, public agency deals 
with procurement of innovation as intermediaries of demand and technological supply which can 
easily  evaluate  concepts  and  their  feasibility  (Schoormans  et  al.  1995;  Veryzer  1998).  The 
expertise of the agency then combined with the big market share available to the public buyer 
mixed the relevant product development information with a clear market sign to buy the new 
product beyond the minimum share needed to overcome the cost of production, making more 
informed  assessments  (Ozer  2009).  Especially  in  the  case  of  high  performance  products, 
governments may play a relevant role, quite often in the very early phase of the product cycle 
(Dalpé  et al. 1992) as it was proved in the case of defense-related demand (Stoneman 1987; 
Lichtenberg  1989;  James  2004).  Innovative  infrastructure  with  dominant  design  should  be 
considered a natural area for innovation made through public-private partnership.  
Satellite telecommunication infrastructure in Italy, 1969-1996
Since the beginning of the satellite era (USSR launched the Sputnik in 1956) space has been 
used for human purpose, including every-day activities such as communications. Progressively, 
the satellite bandwidth allocated to telecommunication services reached saturation. Yet in the 
Sixties,  when  the  4-6  GHz  band  was  close  to  its  maximum traffic  capacity,  the  search  of 
frequency bands around 12 and 18 GHz started.
At the 1971 World Administrative Radio Conference (WARC) in Geneve2, the frequency 
slots  above  10  GHz were  formally  defined  and assigned  to  the  satellite  telecommunication 
services.  The  new  frequency  increased  the  capacity  of  international  commercial  satellite 
communication and made possible the competitive advent of domestic satellite systems3.
2  http://www.itu.int/en/history/radioconferences/Pages/1979-WARC.aspx 
3  G. Perrotta, “Historical Perspective: The SIRIO-1 Satellite, a Precursor of the Commercial Ku-Ka_band Satellite  
Communications”.  15th  KA and  Broadband  Communications,  Navigation  and  Earth  Observation  Conference, 
September 23, 2009, Cagliari, Italy; p. 1. 
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Only two years before, in 1969, the “Sirio Project” started as an Italian offspring of the 
European Eldo-PAS program. This satellite aimed to do propagation experiments in the 12 and 
18 GHz band intended for telephony and television transmission. The experiments made by the 
Sirio satellite would have been relevant to the European countries for the acquisition of data 
valid for systems operating in the Ku_band and in Ka_band. Indeed, from 1981 to 1985, Sirio-1 
was the only spacecraft emitting signals available in Europe4.
The Sirio experiment served well the needs of communication system designer for the 
realization of the first European commercial satellites in the second half of the Eighties. The 
European Space Agency (ESA) launched Olympus in 1989, but it had to be withdrawn from 
service in 1993 due to malfunctions. It was again Italy that launched in 1991 the Italsat F-1 
satellite, followed in 1996 by the Italsat F-2, for the continuation and expansion of the Q band 
and propagation of experiments in wider bands. Again,  the main purpose was to enlarge the 
telecommunication traffic capacity of the satellite infrastructure, this time not exclusively for 
phone communication but aiming the emerging satellite television market. 
Public contract and private development
Despite its scientific and technical success, Sirio satellites suffered several difficulties during its 
development, mainly due to a lack of contractual guarantees. The Sirio project started in 1969 
was managed by the Italian National Research Council  (Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche, 
CNR),  it  lasted  until  1974  with  the  industrial  contractors  participating  at  the  study  and 
development  phases.  Prime  contractor  was  the  Compagnia  Aerospaziale  Italiana (CIA)  -a 
company participated by  Selenia Industrie-  NASA (for the launcher, the ground infrastructure 
and the launch itself), Fiar for the subsystem and SNIA for the propulsion system. However, 
during the first 5 years period there were not contractual obligations for CNR to financially take 
risk in the project development; hence, since the whole risk in the realization of the Sirio satellite 
was fully taken by the companies, the lack of incentives caused a slow down in the activities.
Only in  1974 a contract was signed by the two sides,  the public costumer CNR and 
private and State-owned companies, speeding up the activities that concluded within less than 
three years. The shift from an open, informal agreement to a  public-private partnership (PPP) 
was not only an improvement of the financial and operational conditions of the project, but also 
a major change in the way the work was managed. The agreement overcame the old way of 
4 Ivi, p. 2. 
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scientific  effort  careless  of  timing  and  results  towards  a  more  enterprise-oriented  way  of 
measurement of cost, coherence and schedule of the results on time.  
The experience of Sirio made clear the existence of an insufficient contractual framework 
to incentive the development of risky innovation in public infrastructure. Firstly, the complexity 
of the technology has kept the private companies far from doing the research by themselves due 
to  the  high  cost  and  uncertainty.  Secondly,  the  different  competences  needed  hardly  are 
embodied in an unique firm. Many companies are called to work in team, as in the Sirio case,  
increasing the risk connected to opportunistic behavior in information sharing. Other than market 
uncertainty,  government  may  help  to  overcome  opportunistic  behavior  among  collaborating 
firms operating as a genuine knowledge broker in the innovation process. Indeed, for the second 
satellite system, the Italian government tried to find a solution to the first problem by creating a 
public funds for space activities as part of the research and industrial policies, the National Space 
Plan.
The first National Space Plan (Piano Spaziale Nazionale, PSN) started in Italy in 1979 
for the financing and management of the space activities, either within the European framework 
of  ESA and  at  the  national  level  with  the  aim  of  helping  the  consolidation  of  an  high 
technological domestic industry. The PSN was financed with public funds attributed every year 
by the government on the basis of a five year plan. As the previous public space activities of 
Italy it was managed by CNR on behalf of the Minister of scientific and technological research.
The Italsat satellite telecommunication system was developed in the context of the PSN 
to avoid uncertainty about the willing of the public to conclude the deal. The whole project was 
split in different phases, each ones assigned to a specific company pursuing a specific task. In the 
first step (“phase A”) Telespazio –controlled by the telecommunication state-holding STET– was 
in charge of the evaluation of the technological development. The development of the industrial 
prototype (“phase B”) was assigned to the space division of Selenia and concluded in January 
1984. The “phase C1” (“bridge”) for the realization of the satellite was again assigned to Selenia 
in March 1984, which in the meanwhile made a spin-off of its space division in an independent 
company  controlled  by  the  state-holding  STET,  Selenia  Spazio.  For  the  realization  of  the 
“bridge” step, the government signed an agreement for 26.429 million of Italian Lire5.
While the Italian National Research Council (CNR) was responsible for the development 
of the space segment and the ground segment major elements to demonstrate the technology 
5  26.429 million of Italian Lire in  1984 are equal  to 66336.79 million in 2011,  converted in  34275.86 Euro.  
Archival Source: ASI (Agenzia Spaziale Italiana, Rome. I am grateful to Eng. Delfina Bertolotto for granting me the 
consultation of archives)
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readiness  and the  system capabilities,  Selenia  Spazio  was prime contractor  of  the  industrial 
development  alongside  other  private  companies6.  Beside  the  partnership  agreement,  Selenia 
received in 1985 a loan from IMI (Istituto Mobiliare Italiano) of 3.2 billion of Italian Lire in 
funding for the telecommunication satellite project and another loan of the same amount from 
the  “Fondo speciale  per  la  ricerca  applicata”  (“special  fund  for  applied  research”)  directly 
granted by the Italian Government7. Selenia has collaborated at the satellite platform alongside 
Aeritalia, SNIA BPD, Galileo (for sensors), Fiar, Laben (for telemetry) and other international 
groups. Siemens Telecommunications has contributed for the payload of the satellite, i.e. the 
various "packages" of communications, and FIAR for TDMA modulators on board the satellite, 
and FIAR. Siemens Telecommunications, and Telettra Fiat participated at the ground stations 
realizations8.
The estimated date for the lunch of the satellite was 1988. After the spacecraft would be 
in orbit, the first eight months period have been dedicated to test the telecommunication system 
about performances related to traffic, atmospheric effects, and voice, data, video-conference and 
TV broadcasting.  CNR would have transferred the system operations responsibility after  the 
experimental stage to Telespazio on behalf of the Italian telecommunication company SIP. 
Italsat: technological design
The  Italsat  project  has  consisted  of  two  telecommunication  satellites  (named  F1 and  F2) 
launched respectively in 1991 and 1996 from the space centre of the European Space Agency in 
French  Guyana.  According  to  what  stated  by  the  ASI  president  at  that  time,  prof.  Luciano 
Guerriero, it was “not intended to be a communications satellite similar to those already existing 
on the international  market:  it  was a program which foresaw a wide range of  technological 
innovations,  as  well  as  a  breakthrough  in  the  field  of  space  telecommunication  systems 
integrated in a ground network”9. Indeed, the Italsat F1 provided 30 GHz (uplink) and 20 GHz 
(downlink) to the Italian domestic coverage using six spot beams and a "global" national beam. 
The global  beam provided three  transparent  transponders  each of  which  has  a  36 MHz RF 
6  Dinaro, M.; Marconicchio, F.; Saitto, A.; Saggese, E.; Morris, A., Italsat - The first preoperational SS-TDMA 
system. In: GLOBECOM '88 - IEEE Global Telecommunications Conference and Exhibition, Hollywood, FL, Nov. 
28-Dec.  1,  1988,  Conference  Record.  Volume  3  (A89-26753  10-32).  New  York,  Institute  of  Electrical  and 
Electronics Engineers, Inc., 1988, p. 1774-1778.
7  Archival Source: ASI. 3.2 billion Italian Lire in 1985 equal to 3.8 million Euro.
8  Marconicchio, F., De Padova, S., Valdoni, F., The Communications Mission. Rivista Tecnica Selenia, III(4), 1990, 
pp. 27-39. 
9  Ibidem.
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bandwidth.  These  were  intended  to  carry  24.576  Mbits/sec  QPSK  or  analog  frequency 
modulation (FM) television. The adoption of the Ka_band (20-30 GHz) aimed to overcome the 
imminent  saturation  of  the  lower  frequencies.  The  adoption  of  the  Ka_band  resulted  in  a 
significant  space  saving  both  of  on  board  and  ground  antennas.  The  transponders  and  the 
demodulators were particularly innovative and a considerable step forward of the state of the 
art10. 
The Italsat F1 was intended to be experimental, while the F2 was supposed to be the 
operational one on the basis of the results achieved by the test carried on the F1. When Italsat F1 
was launched it was among the more sophisticated communications satellites and it was used for 
the further design of the European satellites Artemis and DRS, and for the Korean homologous 
Koreasat.
The operational life of the Italsat project lasted for a little more than a decade (1991-
2002). The satellite telecommunications faced in the Nineties the challenge brought in by fiber 
optic evolution and diffusion, a technological competitor. Nevertheless the satellites flexibilities 
allowed the application of telecommunication technologies other than civil use, as it was the 
coverage  of  military  communication  in  Bosnia.  The  Italsat  F2  included  military  payloads 
supporting the military program SICRAL, and providing the first European implementation of 
on-board processing.
The Italsat  F2 did not carry any propagation experiment,  it  only used  a 20-30 GHz 
communication advanced transponder. Nevertheless, Italsat-2 was withdrawn from service by 
mid-2002, without any substitute able to the gathering of propagation data in the MMW bands11.
Satellite Launch 
date 
PPP
(Public buyer - Prime 
private contractor)
Experimental freq.  
bands (GHz)
Geographical  
availability
SIRIO August 
1977
CNR - CIA 11.5 and 18 GHz Europe.
For 7 years
Italsat F1 January 
1991
CNR/PSN - Selenia 20-30 GHz 
(18.7 / 39.6 / 49.5 
experimental)
Europe.
For 10 years
Italsat F2 August 
1996
ASI - Selenia Spazio 20-30 GHz Europe.
Till July 2002
10  Ibidem.
11  Perrotta, The SIRIO-1 Satellite, op. cit.
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Public-private partnership (PPP): Sirio and Italsat
The  case  of  the  public-private  partnership (PPP)  for  the  development  of  satellite 
telecommunication in Italy is of particular interest; other than for the technological implications 
of such infrastructure, it is  interesting for the different actors involved. The terms public–private 
partnership generally refer to forms of cooperation between public authorities and private firms 
in  order  to  ensure  the  funding,  construction,  renovation,  management  or  maintenance  of  an 
infrastructure or service12. A particular form of PPP that combines the advantages of competitive 
tender and flexible negotiation is the  private finance initiative (PFI). PFI transfers risks away 
from the public sector to the contractor, responsible for both the construction of the asset and the 
provision of related services. In the Italsat case, only the technological risk was transferred to 
private.  Indeed, funds were mainly public and provided by government to  finance industrial 
research and development.
A main focus of PFI is the shift of the perspective from the procurement of assets to the 
purchase  of  services.  Governments  makes  a  contract  with  the  private  sector  to  provide  the 
services. Because payments are made only when the service meet governmental requirements, 
there is a strong incentive for the partner to deliver the service properly and on time. This mix of 
mechanisms  and  incentives  means  that,  once  a  contract  is  signed,  it  leaves  no  space  for 
additional payments. 
Various PPP deals are increasingly being considered by public bodies to finance civil and 
military space project. Examples of space program around the world under a PPP scheme: the 
Galileo  program  (concession),  the  British  Skynet  5  (PFI  contract),  two  German  Earth 
Observation projects (TerraSar and  RapidEye), the SpainSat military communications satellite 
and the Japanese Quasi-Zenith mobile/navigation program. These are also original type of PPP 
procurement, which has to co-exist with a publicly funded design and validation program.
In  the  space  sector  public  procurement  is  heavily  affected  by  demand from national 
governments  due  to  defense  and  security  reasons.  Then,  the  space  sector  activities  are 
characterized by  high-risk with a fragile economic viability, even though commercial value of 
applications is growing. 
In  the  case  of  the  design  of  the  satellite  telecommunication  system  in  Italy,  the 
government entered into contracts to acquire not only the final product –the satellite system–, but 
the research and development of the technological solution first. The National Research Council 
had specified the requirements on the basis of the output needed. The Sirio and Italsat satellites 
12  Green  paper  on  public–private  partnerships  and  Community  Law on Public  Contracts  and  Concessions, 
Brussels,   April 2004, COM(2004)327 final.
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were both committed to enlarge traffic availability of satellite telecommunication and overcome 
saturation. 
The Sirio  project  suffered  a  lack  of  contractual  arrangements  that  did  not  share  risk 
between the contractor and the companies, with the result of a slow down in timing. The Italsat 
project tried to share the risk connected with the technological development of an innovative 
solution  between the  public  actor  and the  privates.  The PSN divided the  overall  process  in 
technological phases (evaluation, development, assembly, test) and signed a contract assuring the 
purchase of each service. That way of proceeding also helped the company to respect deadlines 
while traditional public procurements are often characterized by significant construction delays 
and cost overruns. Nevertheless, a contract for buying something to be developed at a specific 
time in the future ensures that the private partner has incentives for timely delivery. 
The most clear and stable legal framework of the Italsat development project compare to 
the SIRIO experience achieved a better allocation of the risk. However, even in the Italsat case 
some delay happened, mainly due to an evolving institutional framework in the space sector. 
Institutional framework of PPP in satellite telecommunication. 
A first change happened after the Sirio satellite was launched, when the National Space Plan 
(PSN) started its five years program in 1979. Before the success of the Sirio project the Italian 
space policy was relegated to the European initiatives or the collaboration with NASA. But, also 
because of the good results achieved by the Sirio satellite and the prior experimental satellite San 
Marco, Italy started its own space plan with the aim of sustaining the development of a domestic 
high-tech industry in the technologies related to the space sector (telecommunication, aviation, 
propulsion, innovative materials, earth observation).
The first responsible institution for the PSN was CNR for the time needed to create an 
apposite center that would have managed the plan. Originally planned to start within a few years, 
the Italian Space Agency (ASI) took ten years to be fully operative. 
In the case of the Sirio satellite, the basic research was undertaken by a public research 
institution (Polytechnic of Milan) while the technical development was assigned to a team made 
of  firms;  nevertheless,  the  risk  connected  to  the  uncertain  contents  of  the  technology 
requirements  inhibits  firms to operate efficiently –as proved by the delay in manufacturing 
operations– until the CNR signed an arrangement to buy the new product. In the case of Italsat, 
the National Space Plan provided the financial requirements needed to cover the risk and to 
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stimulate the firms to explore innovative solutions with the guarantee of government purchase. 
The role of the public demand was determinant to incentive the firms to bear the risk of a  
complex technology and its market potentiality13.   
The  development  service  acquired  for  the  Sirio  satellite  strongly  suffered  from the 
asymmetrical risk allocation. Only when CNR signed an agreement to buy the new technology 
the firms actively developed the innovative solution. In the Italsat case, Italy has had ownership 
of the civil satellite telecommunications infrastructures, based on the principle “Build Own and 
Operate” (BOO), centered on a  vehicle  company established as a  Public  Private Partnership 
(Sciortino 2011, p. 16).
The funding of the PSN in the firms perspective overcame the financial constraints in the 
market for innovation. In the case of Italsat, the certain commitment of the public buyer to buy 
the technology strongly reduced firms uncertainty. The Ministry of research has made the funds 
available for the Space Plan. Since 1988 the Italian Space Agency has been in charge of the PSN. 
Alongside the public funds, ASI “integrates” financial resources, also in kind, with partners on 
cooperative projects. The Agency aggregates resources under different patterns: tendered direct 
finance, market revenues, equity in purpose companies and consortia (Sciortino 2011, p. 15).
At  the  time  of  the  Italsat  F1  launch,  ASI  became  owner  of  the  vast  majority  of 
commercially available Ku-band and Ka-band space capacity required to fulfill national demand. 
The availability of a national telecommunication system avoided the need to buy the service 
from  other  regional  providers,  resulting  in  a  net  reduction  of  the  disbursement  on  the 
international accounts. 
With the Italsat project,  the Italian Space Agency was among the forerunners of PPP 
project financing without a “vehicle company”, in the meaning of a NewCo (new company) 
created within the partnership agreement. Italsat, the first telecommunication program managed 
directly by the Italian Agency had a business model calling for a tight cooperation between the 
Agency (the public party) and Telecom Italia (the private party). In the Italsat programme ASI 
was responsible for the space segment, while Telecom Italia was responsible for the launch of 
one of the two satellites,  of the ground segment,  and of the service provision.  Fundamental 
aspects of project financing centered on PPP was a long-lasting relationship between public and 
private parties establishing a balance between State interests and commercial  viability,  wider 
outlook for financing, and diversified allocation of risks while maintaining clear identity and 
responsibilities. Premise for the success of the operation was a tested level of commercial self 
13 For an historical analysis of the effect of public demand upon innovation see the classic essay by Schmookler  
(1962).
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sustainability  for  the  project.  Institutional  users  strongly  affects  space  sector  demand  with 
national defense and research budgets, while space is a high-risk sector. Therefore a coordination 
of public demand would increase market efficiency taking into account social,  economic and 
political goals14. 
Financial allocation to Italsat in the National Space Plan (in million)15.
ITALSAT expense commitments  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  TOTAL 
Italian £ 
1981 29.680 38.060 50.000 76.000 76.000 106.000 150.000 390.740
Italian £ 
2011 110.400 141.580 186.000 282.720 282.720 394.920 558.000 1.453.470
€ 57 73 98 146 146 203 288 750
Propositions
On  the  basis  of  the  observation  made  upon  the  two  cases,  it  is  possible  to  derive  some 
propositions useful for further research. 
Concerning the investments in knowledge production useful  for industrial  innovation, 
Arrow (1962) has noted either technical and market uncertainty. Institutions are then called to 
reduce uncertainty and transaction costs (North 1984), and for this reason governments have 
historically had an important partnership role with private firms in fostering innovation (Link 
2006, p. 23).
To face market risk related to innovation, a government might help society needs to turn 
into clear market demand.  Thus, when future demand is quite clear because of the signaling 
action of the government,  firms can more easily recognize new segment of market demand. 
Here, a public buyer can ensure the right will to pay for a product developed in a future time to  
trigger innovation activity.
Proposition 1 – A public buyer may help firms to understand emerging market segments and  
spur innovation by creating clear signs of future demand
14 Pisano, Marco; Moving Europe towards a more effective procurement of space-based assets; Space Policy, 2006,  
22(3), pp. 176–184
15  Archival Source: ASI. 
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However, market demand may be not enough stringent to trigger firms in technological 
innovation. Complex technologies may take several years to pay off and require a consistent 
minimum market share to justify such risky investment. High technical risk may cause market 
failure even when a firm is successful if the private returns fall short of the social returns (Link 
2006, p.  29).  The broader  market environment in which a  new technology will  be sold can 
significantly reduce incentives to invest in its development and commercialization because of 
technological lock-in (Arthur 1989) and path dependency (Arthur 1994). Hence agreements must 
cover for the technological risk and bring in enough financial resources to persuade firms to 
explore high-cost innovation. 
Proposition 2 – Contractual agreements supported by an adequate public financial framework  
may open markets for high-cost, high-risk technologies to the firm
A major difficulty in the pursuit of an innovative product may be the need to collect 
multiple  capabilities  among several  firms to  respond to complex technological  demand.  Big 
scale projects often require the conduction of R&D  in teams. A unique research facility is not 
generally available within individual companies; responding to complex demand may imply the 
combination  of  technologies  from  what  were  heretofore  separate,  non-interacting  parties. 
Finding the technologies required and coordinating multiple players in a timely and efficient 
manner is cumbersome and costly. Agencies play then the unique role of exploring technologies 
available in the firms and coordinating the required effort in the most suitable way. Because of 
their expertise, agency promotes the generation of knowledge, and increase competencies and 
researchers' output  (Edler et al. 2005; Edler 2010). 
Proposition 3 – Supporting institutions are able to coordinate different firms competences and to  
promote knowledge generation in a timely and efficient manner at an affordable cost
Sharing R&D information is not just difficult, it can also be perceived risky due to the 
possibility  for  opportunistic  behavior.  The  exchange  of  the  information  needed  for  the 
development of the technology can make the transaction between firms prohibitively costly if the 
incentives for opportunistic behavior are not to be reduced to a reasonable level with obligational 
contracts  (Teece 1980).  Because of  the public  interest  embodied in  the agency acting as an 
intermediary, private firms perceive it as an honest  broker in the innovation process (Leyden and 
14
Link 1999). 
Proposition 4 – The public nature of the supporting institution decrease the risk of opportunistic  
behavior and then facilitate the  exchange of complementary knowledge between different firms
Discussion and concluding remarks
The  two  cases  show  how  risk  allocation  is  fundamental  in  the  design  of  a  public-private 
partnership.  Indeed,  a  weak  element  of  the  Sirio  project  was  the  absence  of  contractual 
obligation to force the public costumer to buy the new product, resulting in great uncertainty for 
the companies. In the case of Italsat, the PSN funds have ensured an optimal harmonization of 
public  procurement  rules  and  market  commercial  value  for  the  private  firms.  In  both  cases 
eventually the team of firms came out with an innovative telecommunication system thanks to 
the partnership ensure by the public that opened a market for a risky technology. In the Sirio case 
is  evident  how  a  clear  obligational  contract  has  provided  incentives  to  the  firms  first  in 
collaborating  and,  secondly,  in  speeding  up  the  activities  in  order  to  respect  on  time 
development. For the Italsat project the financial framework was upgraded with a national, long-
lasting plan for funding space technology.
Risk allocation regards program risk whether the mission will succeed or be on schedule 
to be transferred to the private suppliers; market risk about the commercial value of the new 
product that remains with the publicly funded users; and the technological risk that has to be 
shared between the parts16. For the last reason, the service has to be valued by the public buyer 
before the procurement to optimize cost-effectiveness. Governments need to attribute realistic 
value to the service being purchased, hence publicly funded users must be demanding customers, 
setting priorities and expressing their requirements quantitatively17.
The project management by governmental institutions has adopted a functional strategy 
of splitting the different stages by technological requirements and assigned them to different 
firms, coordinating the whole projects. Doing so has allowed firms to contribute to the project in  
an efficient way avoiding the risk of opportunism in other firm while sharing information. 
Essentials in space-related PPPs are cost saving mechanism as primary goal, to exploit 
the  market  potentiality  of  the  government  buyer,  and  to  adopt  clear  technical  and  demand 
16  Elliot, Chris; Funding for space – Private finance for public space missions?; Space Policy, 1997, 13(2), pp 315-
322.
17 Ibidem.
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forecasts. Alongside telecommunication, space PPPs is potential suitable for Earth observation 
and  meteorological  monitoring  for  governmental  use  that  can  benefit  from the  implications 
derived from the observations here presented.
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